Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. Soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in European capitals as 'cowboyesk' and isolationist. Particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. Under this plan Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the United States. In addition, many officials in Europe rejected Washington's assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America's responsibility in the world. However, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. The European Union published their first security strategy a year after the U.S. published theirs. Interestingly, Brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the US strategy. Similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. This paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current U.S. national security policy, the European strategy and its American counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. Consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. The paper will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy before analyzing the European security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs.
Introduction
Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11 th , the George W. Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. 1 Shortly thereafter, the document was denounced in European capitals as 'cowboyesk' and isolationist. Particular dislike amongst some European governments was publicized about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states and the notion that Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in sovereign countries. In addition, many government officials in Europe rejected Washington's assertion of withdrawing its membership of the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol -it was perceived by them as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America's responsibility in the world. As a result, some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested that the United States and its European allies are drifting apart due to diverting strategic cultures. 2 Robert Kagan, for example, argues that the United States acts like an international policeman that unilaterally enforces international order and stability. The U.S. is willing to use its military powers to achieve political objectives whereas the Europeans are portrayed as a civilian power and less inclined to use military forces. However, what analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.
Wilson is associated with the idea of promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law in international affairs. 4 The former President believed in the "the principles of liberty" 5 and the responsibility to protect these liberties. The same elements of Wilsonianism can also be found in Europe's first security strategy. About a year after the U.S. published a new national security strategy (NSS), the European Union released its own strategic document partly in response to the NSS and the changing security environment after 9/11. This document constitutes the first official E.U. strategy that is dedicated to formulating a common security strategy for the member states. Interestingly, however, is that Europe's first security strategy is similar to its U.S.
counterpart in its Wilsonian ambition of spreading democracy and the rule of law around the world. Both strategies are alike in their messianic approach to create a better world and to enhance global order.
The comparison of the two strategies is an important mental exercise that allows to examine the "transatlantic rhetoric" that took place on both sides of the Atlantic during the debate of the war in Iraq. 6 This exercise also provides a new perspective to the debate of a 'transatlantic drift' and makes the case that in fact the two continents share very similar strategic objectives.
The comparison can also be seen as a basis for a renewed strategic dialogue between the U.S. and the E.U. 7 The central argument of the article is that the two strategies can be seen as Hence, the theoretical lines of conflict between the transatlantic alliance partners should be minimal. In order to support the central argument, the paper will be structured into the following sections: it will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy and the factors that led to its publication. Then, in a second step, the European security strategy will be examined while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs. 70 (1990/1991) . 15 The focus of the grand strategy of primacy lies on great power relations in an anarchic world. It is a classical realist theory. The primary objective of this grand strategy is that a state wants to keep its supremacy over other competitive states that intend to reach a great power status. Secondly, a strategy of primacy is motivated by both power and peace. It tries to ensure peace in the world, and it is its view that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace and stability in the world. "Peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which U.S. capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners". This strategic view clearly demands a unipolar environment; multipolarity is not permitted and not desired. See Barry R. However, the terrorist attacks on September 11th transformed the nature of U.S. foreign policy and shifted into a more defensive realist mode mixed with elements of idealism. Defensive realism basically shares the same assumptions as do classical realists. However, the major difference between the two is that defensive realism highlights the importance of a state's insecurity, which is the driving motivation for a state to act militarily for its own defence. For much of the last century, America's defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence --the promise of massive retaliation against nations --means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.
The road to the Bush doctrine
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The Bush doctrine has four main characteristics. First, the administration in Washington recognizes that domestic regimes of certain states constitute a vital threat to the United States.
This assertion is consistent with Waltz's second image of the causes of war. 23 It describes the internal character of the state -public beliefs and practices, opinions and expectations, political systems and institutions of government that can affect the interaction between states.
Consequently, the only strategic option is to pursue regime change in those countries that pose a threat to the U.S. preventative use of military force. The President reserves the right of anticipatory military actions against any state that poses a threat to America's national security. International law and alliances are no longer the guiding principles of international diplomacy and are being replaced by 'coalitions of the willing', which offer Washington more strategic and tactical flexibility. These new coalitions also highlight an instrumentalist view of international organizations: they are only consulted if they favour U.S. policies and agendas. Thirdly, the doctrine asserts that peace and stability in the world require U.S. primacy. The 'unipolar moment' 24 , as Charles Krauthammer coined it, should be extended. The United States seeks to dominate international affairs for some time to come. Lastly, the new national security strategy speaks highly in favour of the spread of democracy and free markets around the globe. This is a classical Wilsonian element of U.S.
foreign policy and highlights the belief that enhancing globalized trade and freedom will raise living standards for everybody.
Wilsonianism and the Bush doctrine
Woodrow Wilson was the first U.S. president that was confronted with the new revolutions of the twentieth century. 'Wilsonian' became a label for a style of U.S. foreign policy that is committed to internationalism and moralism in world politics that were dedicated to extending democracies.
However, critics and proponents of 'Wilsoniansm' are united in the view that the former president indeed had the largest long term vision of the nation's future. 25 For President Woodrow
Wilson the justification for U.S. global engagements was messianic and a long-term oriented vision for U.S. foreign policy. He was not only a politician but also a scholar and former president of Princeton University who formed policies out of "an understanding of the nation's 24 Krauthammer, " 62. buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person -or nation-to make a living." 42 President
Bush believes that free trade in the Middle East as well as free markets around the globe will create more employment opportunities and higher income for the region. This economic growth would also raise educational standards and employment for their citizens. Expected tax revenue from higher employment rates, for example, could be used to invest into infrastructure, institutions, law enforcement institutions, and a better health care system. some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable." 43 The core objective of the U.S. administration was to give Afghans the opportunity to make the same choices as Americans made two hundred years ago -they chose democracy, freedom, and free enterprise. "The United States will use its moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of 42 The National European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20.XI.2001 , Brussels, 19-20 November 2001 . Further, the EU defines its global power status by referring to the size of its populations and the percentage of its Gross National Product (GNP). 51 The European Council in Feira decided to recruit 5000 policemen that are deployable within two months and sustainable for at least one year. 52 European European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," 9. international affairs that is based on international cooperation. This commitment is consistent with Wilsonian ideas of conducting international relations. Consequently, it can be argued, the European security strategy is consistent with the NSS in its ambition of making the world not only a safer but also a better place. Both strategies highlight the significance of international terrorism and state failures as threats to international order. "State failure and organized crime spread if they are neglected -as it was seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs." 
Conclusion
This article argued that both the U.S. national security strategy and its European counterpart share similar strategic objectives and are committed to a world order based on Wilsonian values and visions. Thus, it was shown that both documents can be seen as complementary to each other and that both are rooted in the Wilsonian vision of international affair -that is the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of people, free markets and open access to markets. Further, the conduct of international relations should be based on the rule of international law. It was shown that despite the unilateralist tone in the current U.S. national security strategy and its notion of pre-emption and prevention, its nature is multilateralist. information in return. The German government, for example, had two agents posted to Baghdad on the eve of the U.S. bombing campaign and cabled a list of possible targets and other tactical intelligence information to the administration in Washington.
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Similar multilateral pledges can be found in the current European security strategy. It outlines clear guidelines how to prevent international crisis. Amongst the advocated policies is the commitment to promote free markets and democracy in failed or failing states, the promotion of the rule of law as well and civilian police commitments. In sum, it should be said that the two security strategies share rather similar visions of a post 9/11 world order. Thus, the transatlantic alliance can be seen as strategically more coherent as Robert Kagan forecasted. Therefore, the transatlantic alliance should have a future to come. 74 The German newsmagazine DER SPIEGEL first broke the story. See footnote 46 for details.
